GGON Submission on the COP30 Presidency Roadmap for Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels in a Just, Orderly, and Equitable Manner

The Global Gas and Oil Network (GGON) is a global network of 320 civil society organisations from over 60 countries working to advance a just, equitable, and managed transition away from fossil fuels. We welcome the COP30 Presidency's initiative to develop a roadmap operationalizing the COP28 commitment to transition away from fossil fuels in a just, orderly, and equitable manner, and we submit the following inputs in a spirit of constructive engagement.

The transition away from fossil fuels has entered a decisive implementation phase: the central challenge is no longer setting ambition, but ensuring coherence, coordination, and enforceable action across national plans, international coalitions, and financial systems. This submission addresses the four questions posed in the Presidency's call for contributions.

(a) What are the most critical barriers — whether physical, economic, financial, institutional, technological or social — preventing a transition away from fossil fuels?

Supply-side expansion by major Global North producers. The US, Canada, Norway, and Australia have increased oil and gas production by nearly 40% since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, while continuing to grant new licenses and expand export infrastructure (Oil Change International, Planet Wreckers report, 2025). Fossil fuel exports remain largely invisible in carbon accounting, shielding this expansion from scrutiny. Weak NDCs, absent supply-side commitments, domestic fossil fuel subsidies, and entrenched industry-government alliances reinforce this trajectory. International Oil Companies continue to expand production while greenwashing campaigns insulate them from accountability.

Structural economic and financial barriers. The absence of fully-financed national just transition plans leaves fossil fuel-dependent economies with no credible alternative to continued extraction. Constrained fiscal space, shaped by sovereign debt burdens, unfair IMF conditionalities, credit rating methodologies that penalize transition commitments, investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, inequitable trade agreements, and intellectual property rules, structurally incentivizes extraction. Most clean technology and investment flows remain concentrated in the Global North; renewable energy projects in developing countries face capital costs two to three times higher than in developed economies. This threatens to keep the Global South at the bottom of global economic value chains as the world transitions, deepening rather than redressing existing inequalities.

Physical and climate systemic risks. Continued fossil fuel dependence itself generates escalating physical and systemic risks from stranded asset exposure as demand peaks and declines, to energy security volatility driven by geopolitical disruption, to the accelerating climate impacts that make fossil fuel infrastructure increasingly uninsurable and financially unstable. Countries that delay transition planning face a compounding risk spiral: the longer the delay, the more disorderly and costly the eventual adjustment.

Governance fragmentation and enforcement gaps. Decisions on trade, taxation, industrialization, and energy investment continue to occur outside climate fora, uncoordinated with phaseout objectives. Diplomatic alliances lack enforcement mechanisms, as illustrated by the Coalition on Phasing Out Fossil Fuel Incentives Including Subsidies (COFFIS) members' delays on subsidies mapping and reduction plans. The UNFCCC itself faces growing pressure from fossil fuel interests. Global South coordination on a just and equitable transition remains fragmented, limiting collective negotiating power.

National Oil Company (NOC) business plans. NOCs control over half the world's oil and gas yet they are largely absent from the global transition debate. Through their current business plans, NOCs are gambling $425bn[1] on projects misaligned with the transition; money that could be invested to accelerate the transition. The business plans, and the legal mandates given to NOCs by host governments, create incentives for companies and their employees to continue to extract and slow down the transition. Only by updating the business plans, including remuneration structures and other incentives, to align with the transition can these state companies be transformed from being a barrier to the transition.

(b) What potential levers, whether economic, financial, institutional, social or technological, exist for accelerating implementation of the transitioning away commitment?

On the supply side: Governments must end all new fossil fuel licensing and establish binding national phaseout roadmaps with timelines consistent with 1.5°C pathways and their obligations under international law. Roadmaps should include explicit transition plans for National Oil Companies and requirements for private companies operating in their jurisdiction to adopt phaseout plans, and strategies for economic diversification. Supply-side planning should identify which oil and gas blocks must be retired and in what sequence, ensuring a managed and equitable phase-down. False solutions such as Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) — which delay genuine transition while locking in fossil fuel infrastructure — must be explicitly excluded from roadmap frameworks.

The designation of Fossil Free Zones or similar place-based, supply-side policies (exclusion zones, Life Zones, land tenure, etc.) prioritises the protection of key biocultural areas and

[1] https://resourcegovernance.org/publications/riskier-bets-smaller-pockets-national-oil-companies-public-money-energy-transition

ecosystems when implementing the transition away from fossil fuels and provide a simple, concrete, first step to ensure protecting nature and people is at the core of the transition. In addition, any solutions that could undermine the other COP30 Presidency Roadmap on Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation, such as using forests to offset emissions and delay the transition, and incentives for the large-scale woody biomass industry, which is a key driver of deforestation and degradation, should be excluded.

On the demand side: Whole-economy electrification, across industry, transport, heating and cooling, backed by accelerated power sector decarbonization is the essential complement to supply-side action. Ambitious sectoral transition plans, building codes, appliance standards, and public procurement policies can drive structural demand reduction. Fossil fuel subsidy reform is a particularly high-leverage entry point: redirecting public finance currently distorting energy markets toward clean energy infrastructure, grid investment, and social protection directly realigns incentives while generating fiscal space for transition.

On finance and the international economic architecture: Reforming the international financial system is an essential lever including: debt cancellation mechanisms linked to national phaseout roadmaps; multinational corporation taxation reform ensuring companies pay their fair share in countries where they operate; elimination of international public finance for fossil fuels in line with the Clean Energy Transition Partnership; reform of credit rating methodologies and IMF conditionalities to price in the benefits of managed fossil fuel decline; and reform of ISDS mechanisms that currently penalize countries for reducing production. "Leave it in the Ground" finance, direct, unrestricted funding for countries committing to no further extraction, should be applied as a concrete implementation vehicle under the polluters-pay principle.

On governance and institutional frameworks: Autonomous government-led transition coordination bodies such as national commissions, just transition authorities, or cross-ministerial task forces are a proven mechanism for aligning energy, industrial, labor, and fiscal policy around a coherent phaseout pathway. There is also a need for international governance frameworks addressing fossil fuel production and expansion. Strengthening existing diplomatic alliances (Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance/BOGA, Powering Past Coal Alliance/PPCA, and COFFIS) through binding membership criteria, transparent progress reporting, and peer review mechanisms would close the implementation gap between political commitments and real-world action. A Fossil Fuel Treaty should be negotiated as an international governance framework.

On technology and innovation: The rapid cost reductions in solar, wind, batteries, and grid technologies have fundamentally shifted the economics of transition. The key remaining challenge is not availability but deployment speed, supply chain scaling, and equitable access, particularly for the Global South. International cooperation on critical mineral supply chains, technology transfer, and local manufacturing capacity is essential to ensure that the clean energy transition does not replicate extractivist dependencies. Developing inclusive and sustainable transition mineral value chains will help ensure the shift away from fossil fuels contributes to economic diversification and job creation in producer countries.

On knowledge and accountability: Common monitoring, reporting, and verification frameworks, including for supply-side production trajectories, are needed to track progress and strengthen accountability. Peer-learning platforms sharing good practice on subsidy reform, decommissioning, just transition governance, and economic diversification can accelerate implementation, particularly where institutional capacity is limited.

On State Owned Enterprises: Update NOC Strategic Plans and Business Plans to align with the transition away from fossil fuels. This would reduce the incentive structures that see these companies pursue further extraction. It would also enable capital to be reorientated away from fossil fuel supply to sustainable energy sources and technologies that would reduce demand. Importantly the process to develop new plans should be inclusive and specific to the local context. Such a move would enable governments to reduce economic dependence on fossil fuels as the companies would no longer be compelled to pursue more costly extraction.

(c) What country, regional or sector roadmap experiences, best practices, and lessons learned can be shared?

There is a rich body of case studies on existing national and sectoral transition processes: lessons from Germany's coal phaseout, Colombia's national roadmap process, Spain's Just Transition Agreements, JETPs, PPCA, BOGA, COFFIS, and others. We also recommend the publication *Progressing the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels: A Guide for Policy-makers Working on TAFF Roadmaps and Plans* (March 2026, iisd.org).

On process design, recent UNFCCC experience offers three important lessons for the Presidency roadmap. First, structured expert technical inputs are essential: the process that informed the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) demonstrated the value of formal technical expert dialogues drawing on the best available science, a model that was absent from the UAE Dialogue on implementing the GST1 decision and should not be repeated here. Second, Party-driven engagement must be genuine: concerns raised by Parties that their involvement in the development of the Baku-to-Belém Roadmap was insufficient are a direct warning against top-down process design. Third, smaller but representative formats can be effective: the Transitional Committee established at COP27 to operationalize the Loss and Damage Fund demonstrated that a balanced, geographically representative group can identify barriers and ways forward more effectively than unwieldy plenary processes, and the use of climate weeks across different geographies to hold mandated events further enables a diversity of views.

(d) How can a just, orderly and equitable transition best reflect the diverse realities of countries at different stages of development and with different degrees of dependence on fossil fuels?

The Roadmap must be anchored in the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). This means structuring expectations explicitly:

high-income, historically high-emitting producer countries must end new exploration and licensing immediately, phase out fossil fuels first and fastest, and provide the financial and technical support that makes transition feasible for others. Reducing Global North consumption is equally non-negotiable. The Roadmap should not treat the pace of transition as a matter of national discretion without regard to historical responsibility.

For developing countries, particularly those with high fiscal dependence on fossil fuel revenues, the transition is not simply an energy challenge but a development challenge. Enhanced international support is required: concessional climate finance, debt cancellation and restructuring, technology transfer, and capacity-building. Critically, this support must avoid debt dependency and enable countries to define their own transition priorities rather than inheriting externally designed conditionalities. Debt workouts conditioned on national phaseout roadmaps, and reparation mechanisms structured under the polluters-pay principle, can create the fiscal space necessary for genuine economic diversification.

For National Oil Companies, it is important to recognise the different contexts companies are in. Some companies and their host governments will need greater amounts of support from international stakeholders (e.g. public and private lenders) to implement transition plans.

Possible Ways Forward

The COP30 Presidency's roadmap initiative has generated significant political momentum that must now be anchored durably within the UNFCCC process. This submission proposes two complementary ways for how to build a credible and politically compelling forward process for implementation.

First, the Coalition of the Doers, which could be formalized at the First International Conference on the Just Transition Away from Fossil Fuels (Santa Marta, April 2026), should unite around a proposal for SB64 in June 2026 aimed at securing a formal UNFCCC agenda item to discuss and agree on a science-based timeline and milestones for the transition away from fossil fuels compatible with the COP28 decision. This would allow for the Presidency roadmap to be converted from a politically significant but parallel initiative into a formal negotiated process within the multilateral climate architecture giving its findings a direct line into future COP outcomes.

Second, the Presidency roadmap outputs should be fed into the architecture of the second Global Stocktake. The Brazilian Presidency could make a submission to the GST2 process feedback, ensuring that TAFF roadmap progress is recognized as a distinct category of evidence in the technical assessment. In parallel, encouraging producer and transition countries to submit strong, TAFF-aligned reports under the Enhanced Transparency Framework, which feeds directly into the GST2 technical assessment beginning in late 2026, would ensure that the diplomatic groundwork laid through the roadmap process shapes the formal evidentiary base on which GST2 conclusions are drawn.